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Another Opportunity in Afghanistan 
Contrary to popular opinion, Mullah Baradar's capture by the CIA acting in concert 
with the Pakistanis is not a game-changer. At best, it presents the Taliban with a 
minor inconvenience. Baradar was the deputy defence minister during Taliban rule in 
Afghanistan and was quoted as claiming just a few months ago that "in every nook 
and corner of the country a spirit for jihad is raging." He will be replaced by others 
unless Afghanistan is fixed. 
 
The Marja offensive launched last week is a new opportunity to learn from past 
mistakes. Air strikes are the easy part -- we've been here before in other theatres of 
war, only to find that the bus has been driven into the ditch soon after. 
It would be folly to celebrate reports about the Taliban fleeing Marja; they are past 
masters at this peculiarly Afghan game of cat and mouse. Operation Moshtarak will 
be a war of attrition. 
 
President Obama requested $33 billion in supplemental funding for the DOD's 
overseas contingency operations in Afghanistan/Pakistan recently. American 
taxpayers are now on the hook for $152.6 billion for 2010 under this head. This 
includes money for the 33,000 additional troops and for unmanned drones and other 
capability enhancement projects. 
Funnelling taxpayer money away from the homeland is only justifiable if Afghanistan 
ceases to be a breeding ground for terrorists. This requires nation-building on steroids; 
to move a country that escaped the industrial revolution into an era of governance 
built on the telecom and internet revolutions is no mean task. The sheer scale of the 
effort requires a broader coalition of allies which must include India, Japan and China. 
 
America cannot build a nation while fighting a war and military success is a 
prerequisite. The current fad for euphemistically converting lower level fighters into 
friends of the West -- otherwise known as buying off the Taliban -- is mistaken. 
Taliban fighters will never become friends of the West. They might be rented 
temporarily, but their loyalties can never be bought. 
This is because their decision to fight America is not based on rational economic 
calculations but on irrational ideological hatred. It is naïve to assume that they will 
switch sides for a few dollars. To the contrary, these bribes will be used to fund 
terrorist acts against us when conditions are more favourable to the Taliban. In 
addition, Karzai's corrupt government will siphon off these funds for their own ends. 
 
The shibboleth of reconciliation must be consigned to the bin and hard task of 
eliminating the Taliban must be the priority. Here's how. 
Where are the Taliban's fighters getting their weapons from? This question holds the 
key to victory. 
 
It is common knowledge that Darra Adamkhel, south of the gun market town of 
Sakhakot (near Peshawar), is home to a large gun industry manufacturing over 1000 
guns a day. M-4 rifles complete with night vision equipment, silencer and torch, 
Kalashnikovs -- for $1500 -- rocket launchers and mines are all part of the inventory. 
Why is this town not being hit by drones? 
 
Unless the gun markets of Pakistan are shut down and the Taliban is choked of 
weapons and ammunition, victory cannot be attained. The first step has to be an 
expansion of the drone program to hit gun markets inside Pakistan. 
Coevally, Pakistan must be made to realize that it has strong incentives to shut these 
cottage industries down. There is considerable evidence that weapons from the NWFP 
are finding their way into cities like Karachi and fuelling a cycle of ceaseless violence. 
It cannot be a coincidence that Pakistan has witnessed three-digit increases in suicide 
attacks over the last year. Yet, their leaders persist with the strategy of increasing the 
flow of weapons into non-military hands. A case in point is the recent move to arm 
villagers with 30,000 rifles supposedly to fight the Taliban. One can only wonder as 
to how many of these will be used against innocent civilians and western targets. This 
cannot continue. Pakistan must be held to account if it is to receive aid. It must 
immediately sign on to the Arms Trade Treaty and prioritise de-weaponization. 
 
Second, how does the Taliban fund its activities? Drugs. The US must destroy opium 
cultivation -- in areas like Helmand -- as a war priority. This will choke the Taliban 
and inhibit its fighting ability. If even a fraction of the resources expended on the war 
on drugs in countries like Colombia is made available in Afghanistan, results will be 
discernible. 
Next, Karzai's government, which is rightly seen to be illegitimate and incapable of 
meeting the democratic aspirations of all of Afghanistan, must not be the fulcrum of 
the political solution. This imperative stems from Afghanistan's divisive ethnic 
politics. Concentrating exclusively on Karzai and Kabul and tailoring centralized 
solutions ignores this basic reality and glosses over the fact that pan-Afghan identity 
is largely a myth. 
 
This nationalist myth must be busted for a permanent solution. The US must have the 
nous for the radical option of partition or at least the second best alternative of 
decentralized functional regional autonomy. The north and west of the country must 
be hived off and given functional autonomy with locally recruited police and military 
units. They must set up fully functioning governments insulated from Kabul's reach. 
This will succeed for multiple reasons. Firstly, it will free up large parts of 
Afghanistan for development without the burden of competing priorities. In addition 
to raising the quality of life, it will create beacons of hope for Pashtuns and other 
alienated groups. Secondly, it will concentrate resources for development in areas 
with the maximum likelihood of success instead of the current policy of spreading it 
thinly. Development will also generate a fresh set of leaders at the grassroots level to 
replace the current discredited lot. Thirdly, decentralization will facilitate greater 
accountability and oversight -- especially important when government institutions 
have been plagued by allegations of pervasive corruption. 
Bribing the Taliban is a gross insult to the 520 military men and women who gave 
their lives in Afghanistan last year. How can we trust even those Taliban elements 
who claim to have renounced their ways? Giving these killers uniforms and weapons 
and making them part of the police and army is a terrible risk. 
 
The Taliban's foot soldiers will merely fatten on these bribes and return in another 
avatar to attack Western targets. If there is true renunciation on the part of the Taliban, 
they must lay down their weapons and face trial for their actions. Reconciliation and 
reintegration can only be offered after they are held accountable and have served long 
prison sentences. This is a minimum requirement in any rule of law society. 
If the Taliban are to be rewarded with bribes for murder, why should the average 
Afghan obey the law? Surely, there are equally flimsy justifications for every crime? 
 
Operation Moshtarak can succeed if we work together with other allies in the region 
to kill the Taliban. Anything less is an insult to our troops. 
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